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PAUL BONDt
INTRODUCTION
Generically, the doctrine of champerty prohibits the sale of the fruit
of legal judgment or settlement, in advance of such judgment or settlement, to
an otherwise disinterested party.' Contemporary scholarship tends to as-
sert that the doctrine is vestigial and on the wane.2 In pursuit of effi-
ciency and justice in litigation funding, many propose an outright re-
pudiation of the prohibition against champerty' The result of such
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This definition is of the author's invention, but it seems best to fit the bulk of the
cases surveyed in the Appendix. The 1913 edition of Webster's Dictionary, the most re-
cent version to which the author is inclined to give credence, defines champerty at law
as "[t]he prosecution or defense of a suit, whether by furnishing money or personal
services, by one who has no legitimate concern therein, in consideration of an agree-
ment that he shall receive, in the event of success, a share of the matter in suit."
WEBSTER'S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICIONARY 238 (Noah Porter ed., 1913).
Webster's is a perfectly serviceable definition. The author's definition of champerty
varies from Webster's because: (1) state law rarely prosecutes the funding of litigation
defenses as champertous; (2) caselaw does not suggest that "money or personal services"
should be treated with any more suspicion than the rest of the universe of valuable
consideration; (3) one may have a "legitimate concern" for the outcome of a suit, rang-
ing from simple human pity to complex economic entanglements, and yet not possess
the standing necessary to appear before the court as a fellow plaintiff; and (4) "suc-
cess" ought to be expanded explicitly to include settlements by which money flows to
the assignees of the claim.
2 See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, The Fee-Shifting Remedy: Panacea or Placebo?, 71 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 415, 425-26 (1995) (citing a proposal that "would allow the market to sort
out appropriate financing arrangements at the expense of vestigial champerty restrictions"
(emphasis added)).
See, e.g., Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs'Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular
(and Legal) Business, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 83 (2000) ("Today a variety of
mechanisms are available to discourage those evils [i.e., interference by noblemen and
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an outright repudiation would be a free market in future legal judg-
ments.
This Comment suggests that champerty's critics underestimate the
continuing vitality of the doctrine. Substantial justifications for the
ancient prohibition still obtain. By examining the interests of groups
most affected by changes in litigation funding, this Comment devel-
ops an alternative to suboptimal "champerty not allowed" and "cham-
perty allowed" rules. This alternative, embodied in a proposed state
Model Act of Champerty,4 simplifies the law, protects those now shel-
tered by the prohibition, and captures the economic and normative
gains sought by proponents of liberalization.
Through a simple slip-and-fall case, Part I introduces champerty in
action. A plaintiff needs money. An otherwise disinterested third
party-a champertor-wants to invest in the suit. A deal is struck.
Unexpectedly, the courts intervene. Part I unpacks the possible ra-
tionales the court may have for interfering, providing the vocabulary
required for a meaningful discussion of champerty. Part II of this
Comment argues that both the total prohibition of champerty and the
complete liberalization of the field exact unpalatable social costs. Part
III, laying out the proposed Model Act, suggests a more active, nu-
anced approach for state legislatures to take. Champerty is simply too
important to be left to the champertors-the State should supervise
the sale of legal claims and shape procedures to protect all interests at
stake. Finally, Part IV considers and responds to the most likely objec-
tions to this pilot program. Appended to this Comment is a brief sur-
vey of the current state of champerty caselaw in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia.
officials in litigation in medieval England, to oppress hapless defendants], making a
ban on champerty completely unnecessary.").
4 The Model Act of Champerty is the invention of this author. Attribution is given
where elements of existing systems have been incorporated. Readers should pay atten-




A. A Conventional Account
A shopkeeper fails to de-ice the path into his store. As a result,
customer Smith slips, falls, and breaks her back. Expecting that Smith
will prevail in court, Jones offers her $10,000 up front in exchange for
whatever she wins at trial. Smith agrees. At trial, Smith is awarded
$200,000. She repudiates her written contract with Jones and gives
him nothing. When Jones sues Smith for the $200,000, the court
holds that the contract at issue is unenforceable as contrary to the
state statute, common law, and public policy against champerty. "In
this jurisdiction," Jones is told, "the fruit of legal judgment or settle-
ment cannot be sold in advance to a third party."
6
For many causes of action, Jones could have purchased not only
the future judgment, but also the right to bring the case to court. For
example, Jones could have bought accounts receivable owed to Smith
(factoring),' or a now-broken contract that did not preclude assign-
ment in its terms, or a quitclaim on property with a clouded title, or
even, in many states, a tort claim not personal to Smith." On the basis
of any of these assignments Jones could bring suit himself and per-
sonally receive the judgment. But "public policy still invalidates as-
signments of certain types of choses in action, including.., personal
torts." These unassignable personal torts include those based on "as-
sault and battery; personal injury; false imprisonment; malicious
5 The intricacies of champerty's history, i.e., its evolution through seven hundred
years of Anglo-American common law, are beyond the scope of this Comment. Read-
ers interested in this subject are advised to see generally Max Radin, Maintenance by
Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REv. 48 (1936).
6 In most jurisdictions, Jones still could recover the $10,000 he gave Smith in
quantum meruit. SeeArthur L. Kraut, Contingent Fee: Champerty or Champion?, CLEV. ST.
L. REv., May 1972, at 15, 19 ("Even where the courts have declared a fee arrangement
to be unenforceable by reason of champerty, the attorney has been able to recover in
quantum meruit the reasonable value of the legal services he has rendered.").
See 32 AM. JUR. 2D Factors and Commission Merchants § 2 (2000) ("'[F]actoring' in
modern commercial practice is understood to refer to the purchase of accounts re-
ceivable from a business by a 'factor' who thereby assumes the risk of loss in return for
some agreed discount."). In general, factors are financiers providing clients (typically
manufacturers or suppliers of goods) with working capital by purchasing their ac-
counts receivable. Id.
8 See 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments § 51 (1999) ("A chose in action is generally assign-
able, if it is the type of claim that would survive the death of the assignor and pass to
his or her personal representative, and if there is no statutory or contractual provision
prohibiting its assignment." (footnotes omitted)).
9 Id. § 53 (footnotes omitted).
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prosecution; invasion of privacy; defamation; conspiracy to injure an-
other's business; [and] unfair and deceptive trade practices." °
In theory, champertous contracts could fund any sort of litigation.
In practice, however, most contracts invalidated as champertous were
drafted to fund tort litigation.' Only the liberalization of personal
tort judgments is considered in this Comment. Some assignees are
exempt 2 and many end-runs around the prohibition have been sug-
gested.'1 But in most states champerty is banned, and champertous
10 Id. § 64 (footnotes omitted).
11 This Comment deals almost exclusively with "champerty" as a defense to the en-
forcement of contracts to fund litigation. See, e.g., Tosi v. Jones, 685 N.E.2d 580, 583
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996) ("[T]he doctrines of champerty and maintenance appear in
numerous Ohio cases as contract defenses.").
All other uses of the term radiate from the illegality of these contracts. See id. (us-
ing "champerty" to mean a tort action available to the defendant in the funded suit,
good against the parties to the illicit contract); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 516(3) (West 1964) (making "champerty" a Class E crime under Maine law).
Sometimes assignments of things are held champertous because the new owner
will have the right to sue for legal judgment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sellers, 84 P.2d 744,
751 (Wyo. 1938) (hearing a claim that the purchase of land with the intent to bring
suit should be voided as champertous).
The assignment of choses in action, i.e., the sale of the right to sue to a disinter-
ested party, often has been disallowed as entailing the champertous sale of a legal
judgment. See, e.g., Roberts v. Holland & Hart, 857 P.2d 492, 495-96 (Colo. Ct. App.
1993) (prohibiting assignment of legal malpractice claims, in part because such as-
signment would "promote champerty"). But see, e.g., Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp.
Auth. v. First of Ga. Ins. Co., 455 S.E.2d 655, 657 (N.C. 1995) ("[A]ssignment of a
claim gives the assignee control of the claim and promotes champerty. Such a contract
is against public policy and void. The assignment of the proceeds of a claim does not
give the assignee control of the case and there is no reason it should not be valid." (ci-
tations omitted)).
12 Often, a fellow real party in interest is exempt. See 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty and
Maintenance § 2 (1999) ("A person who had a legally cognizable interest in the subject
matter of a suit, prior to engaging in any conduct alleged to constitute champerty...
cannot be guilty of champerty ... with respect to such suit." (footnotes omitted)). If
both Smith and Jones had fallen on the icy walk, Smith could sell her portion of their
claim against the shopkeeper to Jones.
Moreover, Smith can sell a portion of her claim to her attorney in the form of a
contingency fee. Historically, the prohibition against champerty had blocked such fee
agreements. See generally Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The
Sanctioning of Contingency Fee Contracts, a History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 233
(1998) ("[C]ontingency fee arrangements were unavailable to a 'poor man' . . . in
1649.").
1 Ari Dobner ingeniously suggests that the modern prohibition against champerty
can be circumvented through careful drafting. Since champerty is legal under the
statutes, common law, and public policy of at least NewJersey, contractors in any other
state simply need to draft their documents so that they will be construed under New
Jersey law. SeeAri Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1589 (1996) (ar-
guing that by "execut[ing] the champertous agreements in New Jersey, includ[ing]
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assignments are unenforceable. Where allowed, champerty is author-
ized only by common law.
B. Three Unconventional Distinctions
This Comment distinguishes three forms of champerty: malice
champerty, market champerty, and public champerty.1
4  Each fits
within the genus of champerty defined above. Any close analysis,
however, may hang on the often-neglected differences between these
species of champerty.
Malice champerty is the funding of frivolous litigation by an other-
wise disinterested party, with the purpose of harming or discomfiting
the defendant. To the degree that the prohibition on champerty was
directed towards this ill, it has been replaced largely by related doc-
trines, such as the tort of malicious prosecution and the contract de-
fenses of unconscionability and duress.
I contend that the rule against champerty finds its modern justifi-
cation in the danger of market champerty. That is, even meritorious
suits, when made the object of unlimited funding, can cause harm in
and through the courts. The current rule against champerty stops this
harm only by stunting the market for future legal judgments.
Finally, I propose that the states have the power to harness all in-
centives toward champerty and turn them towards the common good.
This still-theoretical process could be called public champerty. With
public supervision, full-scale markets for legaljudgments someday may
become as beneficial and uncontroversial as any field of finance. This
Comment suggests one bridge of laws that might be built toward that
goal.
II. WHO CARES ABOUT CHAMPERTY?
Jurists have described the doctrine of champerty as "dated,, 15 "an-
NewJersey choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses in the agreement, and bringfing]
the underlying champertous lawsuit in the real plaintiffs name," a contractor in any
state can invest in litigation). "If these ... steps are taken, investing in litigation is pos-
sible and practicable in any state." Id.
Dobner is correct under the current system, but as I suggest in Part III, state legis-
latures can insist that it is against the public policy of the state to have litigation-
funding contracts interpreted under the laws of any other state.
14 The terms "malice champerty," "market champerty," and "public champerty"
are the inventions of the author.
15 See Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana L.P., 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000) ("[Wle abolish
champerty as a defense. We are convinced that other well-developed principles of law
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cient,",6 and "rare,"'' 7 and have indicated that it is "not often addressed
by our courts. ""' As long ago as 1816, champerty was considered a
"hard-named and little-heard-of practice."'9 This Part proposes that
champerty has not become obsolete; rather, it has become such a
background principle of law that it is invoked under its own name in-
frequently. This Part will subsequently survey the champertous con-
stituency-groups concretely affected by the state's approach in deal-
ing with champerty.
A. Champerty's Importance Exceeds Its Mention
The doctrine of champerty has become obscure. From state to
state, the very definitional elements of champerty vary. Even where
state law arguably permits champerty, the point is too little-known and
tentative for extensive use by planners. As a result, few champertous
contracts are made and fewer are challenged. Judicial neglect, the
conflation of the doctrine with related principles, and the creation of
independent ethical constraints on lawyers all have contributed to the
quiescence of champerty under its own name.
1. Definitions: Confusion Run Riot
Generically, the doctrine of champerty prohibits the sale of the
fruit of legal judgment or settlement, in advance of such judgment or
settlement, to an otherwise disinterested party. 20 State courts and leg-
islatures have added to these basic requirements elements suggested
to them by legal history or modern policy. In states such as Florida
and North Dakota, a contract is not champertous unless the champer-
tor, acting as an "officious intermeddler," provoked or guided the
can more effectively accomplish the goals of preventing speculation in groundless law-
suits than ... dated notions of champerty.").
I6 See Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997) ("To the extent
that we continue to have the concerns that the doctrine of champerty was thought to
address, we conclude that it is better to do so directly, rather than attempting to mold
an ancient doctrine to modem circumstances.").
17 SeeMacke Laundry Serv. L.P. v.Jetz Serv. Co., 931 S.W.2d 166, 171 n.I (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996) ("[T]he common law actions of [champerty and maintenance] are rare in
modern times, having been replaced by the causes of action of abuse of process,
wrongful initiation of litigation and malicious prosecution." (citation omitted)).
19 Reichhart v. City of New Haven, 674 N.E.2d 27, 32 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
JEREMY BENTHAM, DEFENCE OF UsuRy 3 (1816), available at http://
panoramix.univ-parisl .fr/CHPE/Textes/Bentham/Usury/usury. html.
20 Supra note 1 and accompanying text. Other definitions are explored in this
Part and surveyed in the Appendix.
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SUit.2 ' In New Hampshire, only someone who buys a suit with the pur-
pose of promoting litigious strife can be a champertor. In Kansas,
only someone who "frequently excit[es] and stir[s] up quarrels" will
have her assignments barred as champertous. 3 Other states bar
champerty even if the champertor entered into the contract at the as-
signee's urging and for the best of intentions.24 Contingency fees for
lawyers' services are generally exempted from the champerty rule.5
Some jurisdictions, however, seem to apply their champerty laws only
26
to those lawyers who overstep the limits of that exception. In Mary-
land and Virginia, it is no longer champerty for a tort sufferer to as-
sign the fruits of her personal injury suit to her treating hospital, up to
the value of the care she received for the same injuries.
These states have chosen to narrow champerty's scope by adding
elements to its definition. Other states' courts strike down agree-
ments that, while not technically champertous, are close enough to
draw judicial ire.28 For example, in Wilson v. Harris, the Alabama
21 See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) ("[O]fficious
intermeddling is a necessary element of champerty."). That is, the champertor must
seek out the real party in interest and encourage or guide the suit, "'offering unneces-
sary and unwanted advice or services."' Id. (citation omitted). For a similar holding by
the North Dakota Supreme Court, see Interstate Collection Agency v. Kuntz, where the
court stated: "'While the authorities differ as to all the ingredients essential to consti-
tute champerty, they seem agreed that the gist of the offense is the malicious or offi-
cious intermeddling in a suit in which the intermeddler has no interest."' 181 N.W.2d
234, 242 (N.D. 1970) (quoting Rohan v.Johnson, 156 N.W. 936, 937 (N.D. 1916)).
22 See Markarian v. Bartis, 199 A. 573, 577 (N.H. 1938) ("It is our conclusion that,
except for those cases where it is found as a fact that litigious strife is sought to be
promoted, the rule against champerty and maintenance is not now in force in this ju-
risdiction.").
23 Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806, 811 (Kan. 1956) (emphasis added).
24 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-11 (1999) (making it a crime to give any "thing
of value... as an inducement to any person to commence or prosecute further.., any
proceeding in any court").
25 See generally Karsten, supra note 12 (tracing the history of contingency fee juris-
prudence and its expanded use in the latter half of the nineteenth century).
26 See, e.g., Smith v. Childs, 497 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he
defense of champerty does not exist in Michigan except as specified by statute with re-
gard to attorneys.")
27 See Hernandez v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 572 A.2d 144, 148 (Md. 1990) (allow-
ing for the prejudgment assignment of personal injury awards to health care providers,
in light of public policy); In re Musser, 24 B.R. 913, 922 (W.D. Va. 1982) (proscribing
the assignment of causes of action for personal injury, but allowing a hospital to "ob-
tain[] an equitable assignment of the sums to be recovered by an individual from a
tortfeasor to the extent of the value of the services provided by the hospital in treat-
ment of the individual's personal injuries").
28 See, e.g., Miller v. Calvin, No. CIV.A.82-C-2253, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21057, at
*26 (D. Colo. Dec. 20, 1984) (denying the certification of a class action that had "the
130320021
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Court of Civil Appeals refused to enforce a contract that "[did] not
satisfy all the requirements for champerty," because the court believed
that the contract "nevertheless violate[d] the public policy against
gambling and speculating in litigation.'
In short, confusion reigns over what the doctrine of champerty is
and to whom it applies. Failure to create a close band of champerty
standards necessarily stifles prosecution, limits champerty's applica-
tion as a contract defense, and retards public and scholarly interest. 0
2. Too Obscure to Challenge
Aside from the few states that attach criminal sanctions to cham-
perty,3' champerty's most visible impact is as a contract defense.
Therefore, champerty's presence in caselaw is limited by the volume
of champertous contracts.
The shifting and absent champerty standards described in this
Part suggest the risk premiums on such contracts are prohibitive. The
information cost of assessing the state's champerty laws and the merits
of the underlying suit is substantial, especially for a layperson. Except
for a few repeat buyers of lawsuits who can minimize their costs, 32 and
investors in suits with the prospect for substantial profit,33 most cham-
34pertors probably make the deal in ignorance of the law. If the as-
signee of the legal judgment is equally ignorant of the law, and does
not plead the defense of champerty, many courts hold that the de-
taint of collusion, champerty and maintenance").
29 688 So. 2d 265, 270 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
30 In one (admittedly crude) measure of how little champerty is discussed in legal
literature, a LEXIS search run on March 1, 2002, revealed that seven years had passed
since any law review piece had "champerty" in its tide. In that same period of time,
"class action" was the tide topic of 240 pieces, "attorney's fees" was the tide topic 118
times, and "abuse of process" and "malicious prosecution" combined for 18.
31 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 516(3) (West 1964) (making "cham-
perty" a Class E crime under Maine law). A Class E crime is punishable by a fine of up
to $1000. Id. § 1301 (1) (e) (West Supp. 2001). The defendant also may be sentenced
to a term in county jail for up to 6 months. Id. § 1252(2) (e).
32 Dobner laid out the theoretical anatomy of such repeat players. See Dobner,
supra note 13, at 153943 (describing Champerco, a hypothetical litigation investment
company).
See id. at 1530 (citing successful examples of lawsuit syndication).
34 In fact, the author conducted an interview with one champertor who lends as
much as $100,000 in cases nationwide; this champertor did not know his contracts
were void in dozens of states. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Champertor (Jan.
15, 2002) (on file with author).
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fense is waivedY.
Because champerty is economically inefficient for one-time buyers
below a high level of capitalization, few such contracts are made and
fewer are contested, and virtually none on the precise grounds of
champerty. Ari Dobner may yet be right that there is a substantial un-
satisfied market for tort claims,
6 and Peter Choharis may be correct
that such a market would yield enormous benefit,
7 but in the absence
of reliable law, that market will not develop.
3. Judicial Neglect
Even considering this paucity of material, some states have a re-
markably underdeveloped caselaw on champerty. A Washington State
Court of Appeals wondered aloud: "It is questionable whether many
remnants of [champerty and maintenance] doctrines remain in this
state."3 8 A Delaware Superior Court divined the viability of that state's
champerty doctrine: "In [Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton
3 9], the
[Delaware] Supreme Court noted that the activities of the plaintiff
constituted neither champerty nor maintenance, implicitly recognizing
the continuing validity of the doctrines under Delaware law."
40  State
appellate courts in Louisiana, Nebraska, Utah, and Vermont have
35 See, e.g., Croco v. Or. Short Line R.R. Co., 54 P. 985, 988 (Utah 1898) (holding
that the common law of champerty and maintenance is a contract defense that 
must
be plead or lost). But cf Neal Devins, Asking the Right Questions: How the Courts Honored
the Separation of Powers by Reconsidering Miranda, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 251, 261 (2000)
("The duty of courts to look to the law, not just the arguments of litigants, implies 
that
courts can ... address issues necessary to the resolution of the case that neither party
raises in briefs or oral arguments.").
36 See Dobner, supra note 13, at 1590 (" [T] heoretical gains of trade suggest the ex-
istence of a market for investing in litigation."); id. at 1530 (citing successful examples
of lawsuit syndication); see also Donald L. Abraham, Investor-Financed Lawsuits: 
A Pro-
posal to Remove Two Barriers to an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing, 43 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 1297, 1297 (1992) ("In the investment world a return of 1,600% in about 
nine
years would be considered extraordinary to say the least.").
37 See Peter Charles Choharis, Creating a Market for Tort Claims, REGULATION, at
http://www.cato.org//pubs/regulation/regl
8 v4 c.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2002) ("A
market in which tort claims may be bought and sold to those most able to bear 
the
risks and costs of litigation will benefit both tort victims and defendants, and will 
re-
duce the cost of the tort system generally.").
S Giambattista v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 586 P.2d 1180, 1186 (Wash. Ct. App.
1978) (emphasis added).
39 631 A.2d 1, 5 n.1 (Del. 1993).
40 Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 830 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994), affd, No. 383 1994, 1995
Del. LEXIS 395, at *7 (Del. Oct. 27, 1995) (emphasis added).
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barely mentioned champerty in the twentieth century.4' The idea that
champertous litigation contracts have not surfaced in these states in a
century strains credulity. It is the language, not the problem, of
champerty that these states have avoided.
4. Conflation of the Doctrine with Related Principles
Instead of recognizing and rationalizing a doctrine of champerty,
the modem tendency is to have related doctrines do champerty's
work. All of these substitutions, however, are problematic: they either
reconstitute the champerty prohibition under a new name or fail to
curb the evils that historically have required the doctrine. A discus-
sion of some of these substitutions follows, including a discussion of
abuse of process and malicious prosecution, and unconscionability,
duress, and good faith.
a. Abuse of process and malicious prosecution
The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that:
While Idaho law does not recognize champerty and maintenance, Idaho
law is in accord with the many states which continue to recognize that
the goals of champerty and maintenance provisions are still around and
well, both defensively and offensively, in the form of actions or defenses
based on abuse of process or malicious prosecution of civil actions.42
Tort actions of malicious prosecution and abuse of process deter the
filing of frivolous suits. They do nothing, however, to discourage the
assignment of future judgments in meritorious suits. "An action for
abuse of process cannot be maintained where the process was em-
ployed to perform no other function than that intended by law."4 '
In its strongest form, champerty is a doctrine about how lawsuits
get financed, not about which lawsuits get financed. As explored in
Part II.B, market champerty (the funding of meritorious suits in the
pursuit of profit) can be just as disruptive as malice champerty (the
funding of bogus suits to vex, injure, or annoy). Torts of abuse of
process do nothing to stem or regulate market champerty.
41 See Appendix (surveying champerty law of the fifty states and the District of Co-
lumbia).
42 Wolford v. Tankersley, 695 P.2d 1201, 1222 (Idaho 1984).
43 1 AM.JUR. 2D Abuse of Process § 5 (1994).
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b. Unconscionability, duress, and good faith
In abolishing its long-standing champerty doctrine, Massachusetts
put stock in "the doctrines of unconscionability, duress, and good
faith."44 If a champertous agreement is contested, Massachusetts re-
solves that "[w] e shall be guided in our analysis by a rule of what is fair
and reasonable, looking to all of the circumstances at the time the ar-
rangement is made to determine whether the agreement should be
set aside or modified. ' ,45 The doctrines of unconscionability, duress,
and good faith make no distinction between market champerty and
any other commercial transaction:
The basic test [of substantive unconscionability under Massachusetts
law] is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and
the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses in-
volved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances
existing at the time of the making of the contract.
The Massachusetts rule for duress requires that the claimant show
"'he was actually induced by the duress or undue influence to give his
consent, and would not have done so otherwise.'
47 The commercial
law in Massachusetts defines "good faith" as "'honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned.'
48
All of these rules protect the rudiments of valid contracting: fair
process, uncoerced consent, and absence of fraud. But the doctrine
of champerty is only partially motivated by concern for unsophisti-
cated tort plaintiffs defrauded by savvy champertors.
4
" Even if every
champertous contract were a win-win proposition, an unregulated pri-
vate market for champerty would impose substantial externalities on
and through the court system.
0 Ad hoc supervision by the judiciary
44 Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997).
45 Id.
46 MASS. GEN. LAws. ANN. ch. 106, § 2-302 cmt. 1 (West 2000).
47 Freeman v. Teeling, 194 N.E. 677, 679 (Mass. 1935) (quoting SAMUEL
WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1604 (1st ed. 1920)); see also Patsky v. Supre-
nant Cable Corp., No. 97-2527A, 2001 Mass. Super. LEXIS 367, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Aug. 2, 2001) ("[T]o prevail on the issue of duress [plaintiff] ... must demonstrate
wrongful or coercive conduct on the part of the defendant which served to overcome
his mind and will and which resulted in his executing a contract that he would not
otherwise have signed .. ").
48 McCarthy, Kenny & Reidy, P.C. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 524 N.E.2d 390,
393 (Mass. 1988) (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 106, §1-201 (West 1986)).
49 Cf Dobner, supra note 13, at 1545 ("There is also a hint of paternalism in some
of the earliest examples of the rule against champerty.").
50 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the externalities that occur when the court treats
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does not suffice to stem these harms.
The Saladini court's claim that it will consider "what is fair and
reasonable" in determining "whether the agreement should be set
aside or modified"51 goes well beyond the basic commercial doctrines
and standards enunciated above. The court draws a specious analogy
between its power to regulate attorneys' fees and this newly found
power to substantively rewrite litigation-funding contracts. 2 The judi-
ciary can regulate the bar because attorneys are officers of the court,
because attorneys have a monopoly on legal services, and because the
state legislature or constitution has so entrusted the courts.53 None of
those rationales works here. Potential financiers of lawsuits pledge
nothing to the court, fiercely compete with other capital providers,
and are directly regulated by state commercial law. The power to alter
substantively the bargain struck between champertous assignor and
assignee flows to the court through no modern doctrine or custom.5
4
The power is simply the prohibition on champerty in disguise.
c. Contrary to public policy
Meanwhile, "[t] his common law doctrine of champerty and main-
tenance, as applied to civil actions, has never been adopted in Con-
necticut, and the only test is whether a particular transaction is against
public policy."55 In practice, Connecticut's test always voids tradition-
market champerty like any other commercial transaction). The court in Saladini at-
tempted to address this problem of externalities with a final, cryptic footnote: "Our
ruling today should not be interpreted to indicate our authorization of the syndication
of lawsuits." 687 N.E.2d at 1228 n.7. If the court means that it still forbids the syndica-
tion of lawsuits, it is difficult to see under what authority it does so, if not the principle
of champerty which it claims to have abolished. For instance, if contracts governing
the syndication of lawsuits are per se against public policy, it can be only for the same
reasons that animated the champerty doctrine.
51 687 N.E.2d at 1227; see also id. (citing cases which indicate the court has the
authority to give attorneys fair and reasonable compensation instead of champerty).
52 See id. (" [0] ther devices.., more effectively accomplish ... [the prohibition on
champerty's] ends. Our rule governing contingent fees between attorneys and clients
is based on the principle that an attorney's fee must be reasonable. We also recognize
a public policy against the recovery of excessive fees." (citations omitted)).
53 See, e.g., Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 721-24 (1980)
(describing the Supreme Court of Virginia's inherent and statutory authority to regu-
late the bar).
54 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTs § 4.1 (2d ed. 1998)
(explaining that of the three traditional methods by which courts can police contracts,
they have been "most reluctant to view the problem in the ... perspective ... of sub-
stantive unfairness").
55 Robertson v. Town of Stonington, No. CV950534631, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS
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ally champertous contracts. 56 As the public interest in preventing both
malice and market champerty overshadows any private considerations
of utility, this is the expected result.
5. Independent Ethical Prohibitions on Attorneys
The savviest purchaser of any plaintiffs suit is probably her own
lawyer. The incidence of such champerty in contract law has dimin-
ished because the state bars have laid out disciplinary remedies against
attorneys who "acquire a proprietary interest in a cause of action or
subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for 
a client."57
Of course, plaintiffs' lawyers do regularly obtain chunks of future
legal judgment or settlement by way of accepting contingency fees.58
We ought to acknowledge that contingency-fee lawyers are champer-
tors and then use the ethical guidelines under which those attorneys
are regulated to develop models for broader champerty.
6. Conclusion: Champerty Vital and Irreplaceable
For all of the modern doctrines dedicated to closing the court-
room to those who would litigate maliciously, no doctrine protects
against a flood of litigation for profit. For that reason, the prohibition
on champerty remains an irreplaceable prophylactic. The strongest
evidence of champerty's influence is in what it has prevented. Despite
persuasive evidence that a private market in legal judgments would
yield substantial economic benefits, 59 no such market has been recog-
nized formally or encouraged in any state. Aside from accidental
champerty, legal judgment buyers have emerged only where the pro-
hibition on champerty seems absent.6 Champerty, under many defi-
nitions and scattered throughout statutes, regulations, and common
592, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1999), affd, 750 A.2d 460 (Conn. 2000).
56 Cases where a stranger helps a poor plaintiff secure her rights without concern
for payments from the judgment do not count as against public policy-but neither
would they count as champerty. Id. at *8-9.
57 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (1999).
58 I refer the interested reader to Sarah Northway's excellent work on the ethics of
attorney investment in lawsuits, Sarah Northway, Note, Non-traditional Class Action Fi-
nancing and Traditional Rules of Ethics: Time for a Compromise, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
241 (2000).
59 See supra notes 36-37 (citing sources); see also Peter Charles Choharis, A Compre-
hensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALEJ. ON REG. 435, 435 (1995) (outlining "the
basic features of a market for selling, purchasing and trading tort claims").
60 See Appendix (mapping areas of hostility toward and tolerance of champerty in
the fifty states and the District of Columbia).
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law, is parent to many principles and a vital and continuing force.
Yet, what would happen if state legislatures created the commer-
cial and legal conventions needed for an active, open, and permanent
market for future judgments? The following Section analyzes the so-
cial effects of a definite "private champerty allowed" rule and of a
definite "champerty not allowed" rule. While neither is wholly satis-
factory, the hypotheticals highlight the dangers to be avoided and op-
portunities to be exploited should a state create a system of public
champerty.
B. Groups to Whom Any Champerty System Must Answer
Law responds to human need; if champerty is a matter of social
indifference, it is also likely a matter of legal indifference. This Sec-
tion argues quite the opposite. A state laying down a rule regarding
the permissibility of champerty should know that it is treading on
dangerous ground. In the abstract, the administration of justice and
the promotion of social welfare are implicated. For at least ten
groups, under either a "private champerty allowed" rule or a "cham-
perty not allowed" rule, the stakes are much more concrete. The de-
liberating state should be prepared to answer each group and draft a
plan that addresses the bulk of their concerns. The following Sections
illustrate some of the issues faced by these specific constituencies in a
state making a best-faith effort to address the challenges and prospects
of champerty.
1. Under a "Private Champerty Allowed" Rule
Suppose a state legislature abolishes its prohibition on champerty;
champertous contracts, it decides, should be treated the same as any
other commercial agreement. Further, assume the torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process are sufficient to screen out frivolous
suits funded for the purpose of injuring, vexing, or annoying the de-
fendant. Among those who would be hurt if the state's commercial
law supported unlimited and unregulated funding of meritorious law-
suits, i.e., market champerty, would be: (1) plaintiffs who sell for too
little; (2) the wards of deep pockets; (3) those hit harder than the leg-
islature intended; (4) the offended society; and (5) the weary, weary
courts.
Plaintiffs who sell for too little. A newborn is permanently crippled
by a reckless obstetrician. Her parents, ignorant of the law, sell her
malpractice claim for far less than the court would have awarded, or
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even approved of, in a settlement for a similar class action suit.
6 '
The wards of deep pockets. A city bus, whose driver is exercising due
care, is rear-ended. Upon exiting the bus, passengers see a billboard
advertisement: "Have you been injured in an accident? Don't want to
deal with lawyers and wait for money? Sell to us now! 1-800-CHA-
MPTY!" Inspired by the billboard, many passengers not otherwise in-
clined to sue the city enter into deals to do so. The city, which might
have decided to fight more typical plaintiffs, now settles even marginal
suits underwritten by claim companies with seemingly limitless war
chests."' As the settlements pile up, city services to the poor are torn
down.
63
Those hit harder than the legislature intended. Suppose the legislature
creates a new cause of action, good against bioethicists whose negli-
gent advice contributes to medical harm done to subjects in research
trials." The legislature strategically sets a high potential punitive
award capped at ten times compensatory damages, knowing that most
cash-strapped plaintiffs will only get a fraction of 
this in settlement.
65
61 This group is partially shielded by the doctrine of unconscionability. See supra
Part II.A.4.b (describing Massachusetts' use of unconscionability, duress, and good
faith doctrines to protect parties to contracts). In some states, however, the require-
ments of this doctrine are laid out so stringently that it can virtually never be invoked.
See, e.g., Christian v. Christian, 365 N.E.2d 849, 855 (N.Y. 1977) ("[A]n unconscionable
bargain has been regarded as one 'such as no [person] in his [or her] senses and not
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair [person]
would accept on the other.'" (last three alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
62 The suits envisioned here are not frivolous, but rather marginal-neither side
can predict with any certainty the outcome of the case. It will cost defendants more to
prepare responses to suits funded by professional litigation companies, and the threat
that glaintiffs funded by such companies will maintain the suit to trial is more credible.
Services to the poor are most vulnerable to the rollback of public spending, as
they are the constituency least courted by politicians. See F. Allan Hanson, Why Don't
We Care About the Poor Anymore?, HUMANIST, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 11 ("Politicians could
dismantle federal welfare programs without political risk because the non-poor have
replaced their former compassion for the poor with indifference, even hostility.").
While a city was used in this example, the same holds true for large private enter-
prises which make inviting targets for nuisance suits. For example, the phrase, "what's
good for America is good for General Motors, and vice versa," see Linda A. Mabry, Mul-
tinational Corporations and U.S. Technology Policy: Rethinking the Concept of Corporate Na-
tionality, 87 GEO. L.J. 563, 596 & n.126 (discussing the origins of this "old adage"),
holds at least a kernel of truth. If General Motors is rocked with lawsuits, jobs will be
lost; workers partially compensated with profit-sharing or stock options will be hurt,
and relied-upon pensions heavy on blue-chip equity investment will deteriorate.
64 Thanks to Aim6e Kahan for suggesting this example.
This section does make certain nontrivial assumptions about potential plaintiffs'
financial and legal situations, namely: (1) plaintiffs have no entitlement to public
funding to pursue their claim; (2) plaintiffs have no entitlement to public medicine
2002]
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If champerty is allowed, investor-backed plaintiffs no longer will be
cash-strapped, with the result that bioethicists may be hit much harder
6than originally intended by the legislature.
The offended society. A plaintiff suing for the intentional tort of
forcible battery sells herjudgment in advance to a billion-dollar claim
company. Everything she does in court-accusing the defendant, de-
scribing the alleged acts, asking the jury for vindication and compen-
sation-arguably is done as a proxy for that company's economic
benefit.
67
The weary, weary courts. Champerty will create more work for the
already overburdened judiciary. For instance, original plaintiffs will
try to weasel out of champertous contracts when the investors get a
windfall. Then, investors will sue the plaintiffs when the case unex-
pectedly comes up dry. Claims that would have settled will now drag
on to the last dollar of a probable award. And so on.
As I have shown, each of the above groups would suffer from a to-
tal repeal of the prohibition on champerty. Treating market cham-
and those suffering from substantial, tortiously-inflicted injuries will also have sizeable
medical bills; (3) a significant percentage of potential plaintiffs cannot afford to fi-
nance these bills over the life of a tort suit, which may coincide with a period of unem-
ployability; and (4) the worse the tort, the more likely the plaintiff will feel forced to
settle. Where these conditions do not exist, the effect of market champerty is substan-
tially less.
6 This is true both now (current bioethicists will shy away from tort-rich research
environments, to society's detriment) and in the future (potential bioethicists will in-
stead choose fields with less legal exposure, also to society's detriment). Additionally,
normal plaintiffs have characteristics that tend to end lawsuits before the last dollar of
probable award is spent on their enforcement: they need money right away, become
exhausted by the grind of the suit, and/or may need to deal with the defendant again
in the future. In the champerty context, the plaintiffs concerns are different; once
the plaintiff has sold her future judgment she no longer needs to settle for cash, and
since she is contractually obligated to continue the suit, her weariness is no longer a
factor.
67 Tort claims in particular seem to carry with them a moral condemnation such
that they cannot be assigned without exciting public indignation. See Richard A. Naga-
reda, Outrageous Fortune and the Criminalization of Mass Torts, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1121,
1124-25 (1998) (arguing that "recent developments reflect the use of mass tort litiga-
tion as a vehicle for moral condemnation of defendants, wholly apart from the causa-
tion of harm to tort plaintiffs"); see also Choharis, supra note 59, at 462 ("In the medie-
val legal mind, a personal right of action, arising out of contract or tort, arose ...
between two persons and those persons alone. For a third party to assume the right of
action would have been unthinkable .... (footnotes omitted)). But see Henry M.
Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958)
("What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it... is
the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its imposi-
tion.").
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perty like any other commercial transaction ignores the substantial ex-
ternalities such financing imposes. In summary, tort plaintiffs may
suffer by trading their pending judgments for too little, but not so lit-
tle as to trigger an unconscionability defense. Legal sanctions may be
magnified by litigation funding beyond the point of prudence or legis-
lative intent. Society may suffer from the open commodification of
tort recovery, which is unpalatable because of the moral opprobrium
that most nonlawyers attach to the infliction of even negligent harms.
Finally, the already overworked court system may suffer from an in-
creased workload.
2. Under a "Champerty Not Allowed" Rule
Suppose that after a disastrous year of private champerty, the leg-
islature retracts its sanction. Champerty again will be a defense to the
enforcement of litigation-funding contracts. The state legislators,
hoping for a return to normalcy, are surprised when complaints con-
tinue to be filed. Constituencies that had been asleep to the virtues of
champerty now demand its return. Those constituencies might in-
clude: (1) socially-beneficial enterprises that cannot otherwise hedge
risk; (2) shallow-pocket consumers; (3) those who must settle for less
than the legislature intended; (4) offended plaintiffs; and (5) the
courts as servants ofjustice.
Socially-beneficial enterprises that cannot otherwise hedge risk. A "cham-
perty not allowed" rule prevents socially-beneficial enterprises from
hedging risk, thereby endangering their continued existence. Con-
sider a pharmaceutical company which, distracted by ever more dra-
conian tort law, shifts resources from the development of new drugs to
the marketing of existing drugs. If the company could offset its expo-
sure to new tort laws by investing in products liability claims, it would
return to the risky business of making advances in medicine." A
68 "Hedging offsets the firm's risk, such as the risk in a project, by a set of transac-
tions in the financial markets." STEPHEN A. ROSS ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 703 (3d
ed. 1993).
The basic idea of hedging is this: if you are uncertain whether X or -X will occur,
bet on both. While total hedging is fruitless, partial hedging limits your risk. Id. at
711, 719. For companies that are engaged in an activity X investing in competing in-
dustries or in adverse conditions (-X) limits risk. An oil company may purchase fu-
tures contracts on natural gas, for example. A newspaper concern may bet, through
the futures market, that the cost of paper will rise, even while the concern prays it does
not. Cf id. at 729 ("Many firms are faced with interest-rate risk. They can reduce this
risk by hedging with interest-rate futures contracts."). And, if champerty were legal,
pharmaceutical companies could buy shares in lawsuits predicated on the very theories
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"champerty not allowed" rule blocks that investment and those ad-
vances. Consequently, lives are lost.
Shallow-pocket consumers. Shallow-pocket consumers are harmed by
a "champerty not allowed" rule because their rights may be trampled
since they do not have the resources to enforce those rights. A boat
maker negligently skimps on materials used to make a low-end model
dinghy. The money that the company saves is spent on supereroga-
tory safety features for a yacht. In-house counsel assures the boat
maker's board of directors that the purchaser of the low-end dinghy
will settle easily since she likely lacks the financial means to do other-
wise, while the buyers of the high-end yachts have the money to pur-
sue full compensation. 69 If champerty were allowed, investors could
fund the suits regardless of the wealth of the plaintiff. Under a
"champerty not allowed" rule, every plaintiff must be her own bank.
Those who must settle for less than the legislature intended. Those who
are forced by individual circumstances to settle tort claims for less
than the legislature intended are also harmed by a "champerty not al-
lowed" rule. For example, the legislature creates a fund to reimburse
against which they must defend. See Choharis, supra note 59, at 510-14 (explaining the
economic benefits and hedging possibilities of a secondary market in tort claims). In
addition to economic benefit, there is a systemic benefit. If the courts or the legisla-
tures turn the screws of tort liability too tight, the result will not be as economically
disastrous to tortfeasor-investors as it would be to unhedged tortfeasors.
For example, Drug-1 has a 50% chance of making $1 million and a 50% chance of
being worth nothing. Drug-2... Drug-n have the same odds. Consider both the value
and the volatility of a firm which gradually acquires Drg-... Drug-n at the rate of one
per year. At year one, the firm will be worth either: $1 million (a 50% chance) or
nothing (a 50% chance). At year two, the firm will be worth either: $2 million (a 25%
chance), $1 million (a 50% chance), or nothing (a 25% chance). At year three, the
firm will be worth either: $3 million (a 12.5% chance), $2 million (a 37.5% chance),
$1 million (a 37.5% chance), or nothing (a 12.5% chance). The prospects of very
high and very low payoffs have tapered out, and the risk profile of the firm will con-
tinue to flatten as the number of its constantly risky acquisitions grows. Although the
underlying assets remain as speculative as ever, the firm's portfolio of experimental
drugs has become an ever more conservative investment. Even institutional money,
which may be invested only in certain sound instruments, will flow into such portfolios.
Wide-scale champerty permits the same sort of prudent financial hedging. Sup-
pose that the drug industry faced thousands of suits per year, predicated on hundreds
of unique fact patterns and dozens of novel theories of recovery. Any particular drug
company would be hard-pressed to determine, a priori, which suits would win and
which would lose. But, by investing in portfolios of these suits filed against its competi-
tors, a drug company may reduce its industry-specific risks, i.e. the risks it incurs by
continuing to operate in a particular industry, to a very conservative amount.
69 See Dobner, supra note 13, at 1590 ("A plaintiff's isk-bearing ability effects [sic]
a plaintiffs decision whether or not to pursue a claim and the amount for which a
plaintiff is willing to settle.").
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asbestos victims for the medical harms they have suffered. Because
early detection is critical, most healthy but exposed workers settle for
fund-sponsored medical monitoring rather than fighting for their fair
share of the fund. Well-to-do contractors get the lion's share of the
fund because they can pay for their own monitoring and do not opt
out of the fund like most of the poorer workers. With champerty, day
workers could stay in the fight; without it, they need the money for
medical monitoring right now.7°
Offended plaintiffs. Even meritorious tort plaintiffs are harmed by a
"no champerty" rule. Consider a case in which an arsonist burns
down a plaintiff's house. A civil suit against the offender likely will
take months, as defense counsel might raise complex questions of ju-
risdiction, causation, and mental capacity. When the plaintiff at-
tempts to sell a portion of her future judgment to a landlord in lieu of
rent, she is blocked by the rule against champerty.1 Incredibly, she is
told that she must bear the legal wrong inflicted on her and cannot
exchange her legal hopes for immediate relief.72 The civil prosecution
of arsonists, she is told, is too morally important to be the object of fi-
nance.
The courts as servants of justice. Courts' ability to act as servants of
justice may be limited by a "champerty not allowed" rule. The state
courts may have been nonplussed by the increase in litigation under
the private champerty rule. On the other hand, the business of the
courts is reckoning, not rest.7 3 If the flow of meritorious cases is
greatly diminished by the re-prohibition of champerty, the courts may
70 To some degree, the overdeterrence and undercompensation arguments of this
Part reflect contradictory views of how legislatures set awards-strategically or naively.
More important than actual legislative intent, for the purposes of this Part, are the
public's understanding of and political response to the awards set.
71 The predominant modem characterization of legal claims is as economic
claims. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAW 218 (4th ed. 1992)
("Rape bypasses the market in sexual relations (marital and otherwise) in the same way
that theft bypasses markets in ordinary goods and services, and therefore should be
forbidden."); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL.
L. REv. 772, 788-89 (1985) ("The trend in tort law.., has been to distinguish moral
wrongdoing from the legal fault of negligence .... Because negligence-legal fault-
requires nothing more than momentary inadvertence, the demand for restitutive
justice in such cases is influenced less by moral fault than by rule and expectation
violation." (footnote omitted)).
72 Or, rather, that she is stuck in a monopsonistic market where the only permissi-
ble buyer is the one that did her harm.
73 "Other States that no longer recognize the doctrine of champerty have contin-
ued to scrutinize an agreement to finance a lawsuit with care. We shall do likewise."
Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 (Mass. 1997) (citation omitted).
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conclude that persons suffering from legal wrongs no longer can af-
ford to hold out forjustice.
For all of these reasons, the "champerty not allowed" rule is also
suboptimal. The economic benefits of a market for tort judgments
dry up. The least well-off are made to bear legal wrongs. Remedies
are not given their full measure. And the doors to the courtroom
close. Consequently, it is no great mystery why the state legislatures
have not engaged in substantive debate about legalizing private
champerty. "Pandora, overcome with curiosity, opens the box,
whereupon ten thousand evils fly out of it and begin to plague the life




III. A PILOT PLAN FOR STATE ACTION
As can be seen from Part II.B above, both the "private champerty
allowed" and "champerty not allowed" rules are inefficient. Either
rule would harm the citizenry. Both yield unjust results. Happily,
these polar opposites are not the only options. As this Part argues, a
whole spectrum of attitudes toward champerty can be accommodated
with one flexible system of public supervision and adjudication. This
system of public champerty interposes the authority of the state between
assignor and assignee, provides official approval of champertous
transactions, and ensures that these transactions, as a group, serve the
commonwealth.75
A broad outline of such an experiment is sketched below. One
state, acting alone, could establish a system of public champerty prof-
itably. Ideally, every state would adopt and adapt a similar system.
Under such a system, the rubble of the old champerty statutes and
judge-made law would be stripped away. The only avenue of cham-
perty not foreclosed would be a state-run auction. If the assignee and
assignor chose to participate, they would waive their rights to a stan-
dard state or federal judicial forum. At the discretion of the defen-
dant, the case could be removed to a state-created court of champerty.
The Model Act of Champerty ("the Act") developed in this Part
is tested in Part III.G for its effects on the champertous constituency.
74 2 WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: THE LIFE OF GREECE 101 (Simon
& Schuster 15th prtg. n.d.) (1939).
75 The author bears full responsibility for bringing the term "public champerty"
into the world. May it be better-loved than "stagflation," longer-lived than "costard,"
and less-abused than "defenestration."
76 See supra note 4 (noting the Act's origin with the author).
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The results suggest that with the proper institutional incentives, public
champerty could become a successful, popular system that is alsojust.
A. The Right Actor to Install Public Champerty Is the State Legislature
Champerty ought to be normalized and regularized by state legis-
latures. State legislatures are engines of creation, bastions of plenary
governmental power, minor sovereigns. For simplicity's sake, here I con-
sider the assignment of future judgments arising under state law claims, liti-
gated by nondiverse parties.
The logic behind the American federal system is helpful when de-
ciding between a uniform national standard of conduct
7 and the het-
erogeneity of independent state action. "The first, and most axio-
matic, advantage of decentralized government is that local laws can be
adapted to local conditions and local tastes . ,,.' Because tastes re-
garding champerty vary wildly from state to state, champerty laws also
should be allowed to vary.v9 As founding father James Wilson de-
scribed federalism, "' [w] hatever object of government is confined in
its operation and effect, within the bounds of a particular State, should
be considered as belonging to the government of that State."'
80 Here,
the state creates the laws under which the parties litigate. Citizenship
is nondiverse. Following a Model Code of Champerty, the state cre-
ates the laws under which the founding contract is drafted. Either a
standard state judicial forum or a state champerty court will decide
the case. Wilson could not have devised an action of government
more perfectly contained "within the bounds" of a state. "A final rea-
son why federalism has been thought to advance the public good is
that state and local governmental units will have greater opportunity
and incentive to pioneer useful changes."
8 Indeed, fifty individual
simultaneously running state experiments in public champerty would
quickly gather the data necessary to guide all of the systems closer to
their social ideal. A unitary system of public champerty would squelch
77 "Uniform national standard of conduct" embraces both obligations imposed on
the states by federal legislation and schemes in which the states voluntarily adopt a sin-
gle standard, like the Uniform Commercial Code.
78 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1484, 1493 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS'
DESIGN (1987)).
79 See Appendix (describing the varying champerty laws in the fifty states and the
District of Columbia).
80 McConnell, supra note 78, at 1495 (citation omitted).
81 Id. at 1498.
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innovation, prevent competition, and make comparative analysis im-
possible.
The main drawback of independent state action "is the tyranny of
a majority faction. Since any given faction is more likely to be concen-
trated in a particular locality, . . . it follows that factional tyranny is
more likely in the state legislatures than in the Congress of the United
States. 's Under the system of public champerty suggested below, the
only time a case gets into a court of champerty is when both plaintiff
and defendant put it there. Since both voluntarily forgo a standard
judicial forum, neither can claim true factional oppression by the state
legislature.
The legislature is a more appropriate forum than the courts in
which to establish a rule of workable champerty. The legislature is
better at handling the mainly political questions at hand.83 Only legis-
lative enactments can provide the positive assurance to potential in-
vestors that champerty will indeed be welcome in the future.84
B. Define Champerty
The first step in establishing a system of public champerty must be
the creation of an encompassing definition of what the doctrine em-
braces.85
Model Act of Champerty, Section 1: For all state law claims wherein
both plaintiff and defendant parties include at least one citizen of this
state (a) any transaction is champertous wherein: (1) the assignor is able
to bring or continue an action in court; (2) the assignee is not able to
bring or continue the same action; (3) the assignee is not an attorney
employed as a legal representative of the assignor; (4) the assignor and
82 Id. at 1501-02.
83 SeeLochner v. NewYork, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (HolmesJ., dissenting) (assert-
ing that our political system is "made for people of fundamentally differing views"). See
generally Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political
Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 643 (1989) (tracing the historical boundary be-
tween what is considered political and what is considered judicial).
84 "Until you have universal, well-protected, clear, and transferable private prop-
erty rights, you cannot have a market economy .... " Dario Fernandez-Morera, Out-
laws and Addresses: An Interview with Hernando De Soto, REASON ONLINE 37 (Feb.
1994), http://reason.com/DeSoto.shtml.
85 "Tzu-lu said, If the prince of Wei were waiting for you to come and administer
his country for him, what would be your first measure? The Master said, It would cer-
tainly be to correct language." CONFUCIUS, THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 171 (Arthur
Waley trans., Vintage Books 1989) (1938).
See supra Part II.A.5 (discussing independent ethical prohibitions on attorneys).
MAKING CHAMPERTY WORK
assignee agree prior to final legal judgment or settlement;
7 (5) and the
object of their agreement is that the assignor will give the assignee at
least a portion of the eventual fruits of legal judgment or settlement in
exchange for consideration furnished prior to final legal judgment or
settlement.
This definition does not include the malice elements currently re-
quired by some state definitions.88
C. Clear Away the Deadwood
If champerty is to become a purely public system, all modes of pri-
vate champerty must be eliminated. Thus, the Model Act of Cham-
perty must start by clearing away traditional systems of private cham-
perty. The most sure-footed way to do this is to predicate state court
jurisdiction over champertous contract enforcement
9 on the produc-
tion of an evidentiary document.
Model Act of Champerty, Section 2: (a) No person shall be entitled to
enforce champertous contracts where the underlying case has not been
certified to the trial court with a state declaration of champerty, meeting
all of the requirements of section 3(j) of this Act. (b) Such contracts
shall be interpreted as any other commercial agreement, notwithstand-
ing traditional prohibitions or hostilities against champerty.
Because section 1 of the Act defines champerty so broadly and
with so few circumstantial elements, section 2(a) defeats most private
champertous contracts immediately. As a result, state residents can-
not defeat the prohibition on private champerty by drafting contracts
under the laws of another state.
90 Moreover, with so few circumstan-
tial elements at issue, the public cost of dismissing these private
87 A useful substitute for the "final legal judgment or settlement" might be "final
decision." See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) ("A 'final decision'
generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.").
88 See supra Part I1.A.1 (discussing the confusing range of state definitions of
chamTperty).
Impliedly, claims for compensation for the tort of "interference with a champer-
tous contract" also would be beyond state courts' ability to enforce. No tort of inter-
ference can be established without first establishing that there was a valid contract with
which to interfere. 45 AM.JUR. 2D Interference § 4 (1999).
The withdrawal of enforceability defeats the Dobner exceptions discussed supra
note 13. Regardless of the law selected by the contractors, under this system of public
champerty, no litigation-financing contract will be enforced by state courts without a
declaration of champerty. The counterparties can file suit in a neighbor-state court
without these rules of public champerty if the parties can find a jurisdictional nexus
and if the neighbor state wants to spend resources on hearing these claims.
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champerty suits will shrink to the vanishing point.
The remainder of section 2 instructs the state courts to handle
publicly certified champerty cases as any other commercial transac-
tion. The procedural safeguards built into the auction system and the
procedural rights the system affords to defendants make judicial hos-
tility to champertous suits unnecessary. 91
D. Give the Plaintiff a Choice: Keep or Sell
Model Act of Champerty, Section 3: (a) Consistent with the provisions
of this Act, the state attorney general shall establish and supervise the
auctions described herein. (b) Plaintiffs, (1) having filed a suit in a state
court, that (2) alleges a violation of state law, shall have the right to sell
the judgment of that suit in the manner described herein. (c) To be eli-
gible to sell her judgment, a plaintiff must sign a waiver, forgoing her
right to trial in a standard state judicial forum, and accepting the adjudi-
cation of the state courts of champerty. The waiver must explain the dif-
ference in procedure between the courts of champerty and the standard
state judicial forum. (d) To be eligible to buy the judgment, prospective
purchasers must sign the same waiver. (e) A panel of experts selected by
the attorney general shall set the minimum price at which the suit may
be sold. If no bid meets the established minimum, the plaintiff's waiver
is null and void. (g) This panel may stay the auction of the suit until
such time as the plaintiff can submit enough information for the panel
to make a reasonable estimation of its value. (h) The Department ofJus-
tice may disqualify the suit from sale if there already have been substan-
tial proceedings on the merits in state court, unless those proceedings
were required by the panel to satisfy section 3(g) of this act. (i) The suit
shall be sold to the highest eligible bidder. (j) The Department shall fi-
nalize the sale by submitting to the clerk of the trial court a sworn decla-
ration of champerty. Such declarations shall certify the party names,
date of sale, minimum bid, final selling price, and the name of the pur-
chaser, and shall indicate the approval of the Department official over-
seeing the auction. (k) The plaintiff must give notice of this sale to the
defendant within five days of the filing of this declaration.
This section of the Act provides several important provisions con-
cerning a plaintiff's choice, waiver, timing, auction, certification, and
secondary markets. First and foremost, this section guarantees choice
for plaintiffs. No plaintiff should have to sell her suit. The choice
should be hers: keep her claim to legal judgment and enjoy all of the
privileges ofjudicial forum that attach to it, or sell her entire claim in
91 See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the fact that these suits will be heard in special-
ized champerty courts with self-selected champertyjudges will reduce judicial hostility
to the idea).
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a state-supervised auction. Once the plaintiff makes the choice to sell,
she must sign a waiver, agreeing to litigate the suit in the forum of the
defendant's choice. All bidders and subsequent purchasers of this
claim to legal judgment must sign the same waiver.
92 Section 3(g)
recognizes that some discovery may be necessary for auction partici-
pants to get a rough idea of the value of the suit prior to sale.
To make sure that plaintiffs are not swindled, it is important that
the state run the auction. Under section 3(e), a panel of knowledge-
able legal professionals sets the reserve price, the minimum bid ac-
ceptable for the claim.
4 If the reserve price is not met, the waiver is
null and void. Otherwise, the highest bidder purchases the claim.
95
Following the auction, the auctioneer is required by section 3(j) to file
a declaration of champerty with the clerk of the trial court.
The legislature may draft special rules to govern the resale of legal
claims or may treat them as any other financial paper.
96 At any rate,
no legal claim can be resold before the defendant exercises her
92 See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the constitutionality of this waiver.
93 David Friedman, however, suggests that the value of a suit generally can be de-
termined on the basis of very few data points. See generally David Friedman, More Justice
for Less Money, 39 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211 (1996) (analyzing a "radical solution to the
problem of litigating mass torts" implemented by a federal judge in Texas, in which
samples of the plaintiff class had their case heard, with the results extrapolated to the
whole).
94 Other protections can also be put in place: all bids can be recorded and wit-
nessed; a notary public can be present; a minimum number of bidders can be required
to ensure thick markets and accurate price information; the state may require that
bidders be bonded; the substance of the information made public can be made uni-
form in the timing of release to the bidders. Cf Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-
Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 327, 335-51, 374-409 (1999) (laying out the tech-
nical requirements for effective markets in legal claims).
95 Such a bidder may, in the interest of preserving incentive, sell the plaintiff back
a portion of her legal judgment. Alternatively, the state may require such resale as a
condition of the plaintiffs participation in the auction.
96 There might be ethical reasons for establishing special rules, at least regarding
investor-attorneys. See infra Part IV.B (noting that the state or state bar should take
steps to avoid "insider trading" by lawyers and to control ethical conflicts). The ques-
tion of whether federal securities law will impose additional registration requirements
is beyond the scope of this Comment. See Jennifer Carlucci, Note, Litigation Funding
Devices for Franchisees: Are They Securities?, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 353, 375 (1996) 
(noting
that "it would not be surprising for investor-financed lawsuits to be found to qualify 
as
securities under federal securities laws"). But see Donald L. Abraham, Investor-Financed
Lawsuits: A Proposal to Remove Two Barriers to an Alternative Form of Litigation Financing,
43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1297, 1319 (1992) ("[Blecause a literal application of the federal
securities laws poses a regulatory hinderance [sic] to the investor-financed lawsuit, 
an
exception should be made .... The exception is warranted because the regulation of
lawsuit financing does not further Congress's goals in enacting these laws.").
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choice, as laid out below.
E. Give the Defendant Three Choices: Match, Remove, or Stick
Model Act of Champerty, Section 4: (a) Where a declaration of cham-
perty, satisfying all of the requirements set forth in section 3(j) of this
Act, has been filed with the clerk of the court, a defendant may:
(1) agree to match the selling price set forth in the declaration, in which
case the purchaser must sell the suit to the defendant; or (2) remove the
case to the state courts of champerty, as established by section 5 of this
Act. (b) If the plaintiff exercises neither of these options within thirty
days of the filing of the declaration, both options are extinguished, and
the case shall stay in the state courts.
With the declaration of champerty filed, the defendant may,
within a certain time period, make one of three choices. The defen-
dant's first option is to buy the suit from the highest bidder by match-
ing the auction price paid.9' Her second option is to remove the case
from the standard state court forum to a state-created court of cham-
perty. Lastly, the defendant may choose to defend the claim in state
court.
If the claim is truly frivolous, little money will be paid for it, and
the defendant can immediately end the suit by paying that small
amount. If the modest merits of the case or the defendant's inferior
financial resources make this quick decision an attractive option for
the defendant, then she can remove the case to the court of cham-
perty. If, on the other hand, the defendant has a financial advantage
over the plaintiff, the defendant can choose the much longer grind of
the standard judicial forum.
F. Have the State Make a Choice: Establishing the Courts of Champerty
Model Act of Champerty, Section 5: (a) We hereby establish a state
court of champerty. (b) This court shall have jurisdiction over only
those cases wherein ajudgment has been sold in advance of auction con-
sistent with the provisions of section 3 of this Act and wherein a declara-
tion of champerty has been filed consistent with section 3(j) of this Act
and wherein the defendant has exercised her right to remove to the
courts of champerty consistent with section 4(a)(2) of this Act.
(c) Where the court of champerty has jurisdiction over the case, it shall
follow the Rules of Champertous Procedure provided by the state su-
preme court, to the degree that those rules are consistent with this Act
97 Under the civil law, just such an option is available. For a critique of its opera-
tion, see Dobner, supra note 13, at 1552-55.
1324 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1297
the Rules might provide the foundation from which the legislature
would subtract. In enacting procedural rules for courts of champerty,
the state legislature might consider changing Rules 30-33 to reduce
the number of interrogatories and depositions allowed."" Addition-
ally, it might consider abbreviating the discovery schedule under Rule
26 10 or lowering the summary judgment standard under Rule 56.1
4
These are just a few examples of the possible procedural alterations
that could be made in developing procedural rules of the courts of
champerty.
Alternatively, the state could start with the philosophical bare
bones of a fair trial and build up.0 5 The state might also shift from an
adversarial to an inquisitional mode.'06 Under the latter, the judge
would be allowed to decide what she would need to know to make a
decision and would possess the power and resources to do so.'O°
The states are also not compelled to offer the plaintiff the same
amount of procedural protections that it offers the defendant. If the
plaintiff opts into a trial with unilaterally reduced procedure, that is
her prerogative. A strong case can be presented in a few damning
strokes. For example, (1) here is a videotape of the police beating
me, (2) here is eyewitness testimony, (3) here is one of the defen-
dant's confessions, and (4) case closed.
Each state has its own attitude toward champerty, willingness to
hear champertous suits, resources to so do, fear of over- and under-
enforcement of legal remedies, and proclivity for or disdain of juris-
prudential innovation. This Comment argues that public champerty
may be worthwhile independent of the actual procedures adopted by
the courts of champerty.
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.").
1Y, See FED. R. CIv. P. 30-33 (governing the discovery process as it pertains to depo-
sitions and interrogatories). The Federal Rules allow a party to take depositions of any
person, without leave of court, in most circumstances. Id. The Rules also allow a party
to serve twenty-five interrogatories upon the other party. Id.
103 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (setting the ground rules for the discovery process as a
whole).
104 See FED. R. CIv. P. 56 (providing the standard for summaryjudgment).
105 See generally HenryJ. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267,
1279-95 (1975) (providing a menu of eleven basic procedural elements, each of which
make adjudication more fair, but each of which exacts an administrative cost).
106 Id. at 1289-91.
107 The judge may not need much information to render an informed judgment.
See generally Friedman, supra note 93, at 211 (analyzing a method implemented by a
federal judge in Texas, in which samples of the plaintiff class had their cases heard,
with the results extrapolated to the whole).
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and with our subsequent legislation. (d) However, the courts must fol-
low the Rules of Champertous Procedure as constituted on the date of the
sale, as recorded in the declaration of champerty, regardless of any subsequent
judicial revisions.98
Those of us trained in U.S. civil procedure take for granted cer-
tain robust minimums of procedure. A fair trial, we think, ought to be
like a full Article III trial. Philosophically, for a trial to hew to the
foundations of what we think of as equity, this need not be so. The
original plaintiff chose to sell her claim to legal judgment, and thus
voluntarily exposed herself to adjudication in the courts of champerty.
The champertor-investors took the same risk, and signed the same
waiver. If the courts of champerty are less hospitable for plaintiffs,
then that treatment is surely accounted for by the auction price paid.
Finally, for a case to arrive in these courts, the defendant must have
affirmatively removed it there. Therefore, as long as all of these par-
ticipants know the rules of adjudication beforehand, any procedure is
fair. A coin flip, a reading of the I Ching, an arm wrestling contest be-
tween counsel-all of these are fair modes of decision among the
people who chose them. To the volunteer, no injury is done.
99
Thus, in fairness, the state legislature can endow these courts with
any mode of adjudication it sees fit. The state, however, has a digni-
tary interest in the adjudicatory forums that it provides. For this sys-
tem of public champerty to endure, it must earn the respect of law-
yers, the judiciary, and the public at large. While these courts of
consent are excellent candidates for vanguard innovations in civil
procedure,100 the need to establish legitimacy recommends starting
with a traditional, well-understood, and well-respected judicial model.
Existing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide one traditional
judicial model.'1 Arguably the fullest exposition of trial procedure,
98 Barring a state constitutional amendment, the state legislature cannot tell the
court to ignore future legislative revisions.
99 As John Rawls put it, explaining his concept of fairness: "[clonceptions of jus-
tice are to be ranked by their acceptability to persons so circumstanced." JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17 (1971). As many of my readers have noted, Rawls himself
likely would disagree with some or all of the conclusions that I have drawn based on
this maxim, and hence with some or all of my proposals. To this I can only reply that
even Iohn Rawls is entitled, on occasion, to be wrong.
"[A] rbitration also opens the gates of procedural imagination, permitting the
parties to provide rules of procedure that differ dramatically from the ones we see in
courts...." STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 600 (4th ed. 1996).
101 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 ("These rules govern the procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity
or in admiralty .... They shall be construed and administered to secure the just,
2002]
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G. Poll the Constituency
The state should endow the courts with procedure that addresses
and answers the concerns of the groups cited above.'0 0 The safeguards
built into the auction procedure already have answered the concerns
raised by the plaintiffs who sell for too little. 1° Though plaintiffs still
may sell for too little, the setting of a reserve price by an expert panel
will ensure that the shortfall is not unconscionable, even under the
most protective meanings of that term."°
The concerns raised by the wards of deep pockets are similarly
protected.'"' The fact that all claims initially must be sold through
state-supervised auction mechanisms ' 12 diffuses the incentive for pro-
spective buyers to advertise directly to prospective plaintiffs."l3 Also,
the plaintiff must produce not just a colorable claim, but a marketable
claim to legal judgment. Plaintiffs that fail to do so will either (1) re-
ceive no financing, in which case licensed champerty has not hurt de-
fendants at all, or (2) elicit such minimal bids as to tempt defendants
to exercise their prerogative to settle the claim at the auction price.
Those hit harder than the legislature intended can also be pro-
tected by legislative action. The legislature can provide two standards
of recovery-one for suits in which a declaration of champerty has
been filed, and one for all other suits. Suppose, for example, that the
legislature had predicted that the average rate of recovery in suits
against bioethicists, absent champerty, would be fifty percent of that
provided by statute. The legislation could be amended to reduce re-
covery in the courts of champerty to half of that provided in the stan-
dard forum. This provision would eliminate the windfall that other-
wise would accrue to fully financed and contractually relentless
108 See supra Part II.B (noting the concerns of plaintiffs who sell for too little, the
wards of deep pockets, those harder hit than the legislature intended, the offended
socie a, and the weary, weary courts under a "private champerty allowed" rule).
See supra note 61 and accompanying text (outlining these concerns).
See supra Part II.D (proposing Model Act of Champerty § 3(e), requiring the
settin of a reserve price).
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (outlining the issues raised by the
wards of deep pockets).
.12 Supra Part III.C (proposing Model Act of Champerty § 2(a)).
3 If champerty becomes big business, the demand for claims might be powerful
enough to allow all buyers to pay into a joint advertisement pool. Cf Milk Marketing
Board, Got Milk?, at http://www.got-milk.com (last visited Feb. 8, 2002) (exemplifying
a highly successful advertising campaign funded by a trade association). The state
could ban such advertising as a condition for getting a license to buy at a champerty
auction.
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plaintiffs. At the same time, the relative compensatory positions of the
defendant and the plaintiff, as originally envisioned by the legislature,
would be maintained.
In theory, the concerns of the offended society may be more diffi-
cult to mollify. Any system that permits champerty in a thoroughgo-
ing way will offend those who see legal claims as entailing moral
claims. The only answer responsive to this group is for plaintiffs to
pay for their offense with reduced procedure.
To illustrate this point, suppose $Xis the cash value of the offense,
i.e., how much those offended would have to be paid to accept a sys-
tem of champerty. $Y, is the auction value of the claim if it were enti-
tled to a full trial in a standard state forum. $ 2 is the auction value of
the claim if exposed to the courts of champerty, endowed with what-
ever procedure the legislature provides. If the legislature equips the
courts of champerty so that the difference between $Y and $2 is
greater than $X, then any plaintiff who still chooses champerty is
evincing such benefit that it must be considered a net social good."
4
If the moral offense is overwhelming, however, then, the proce-
dure might have to be reduced so drastically as to have the same effect
as an outright prohibition on champerty. But this reality seems un-
likely. Champerty will naturally lose its shock value as it becomes
more common.15 As role models, the legislatures' and courts' accep-
tance of champerty will encourage the public to accept it." 6 In light
of these constraints on moral outrage, the not-so-offended society may
114 For example, suppose the society is offended $100 by the battery victim selling
her judgment to a claims company. If, because of reduced procedure in the courts of
champerty, her claim is worth only $1000 at auction instead of $2000, and she chooses
to sell it anyway, the value of the champertous procedure to her is in excess of $1000.
Since the offense is ten times more valuable than it is detrimental, it produces net so-
cial gain. The inequitable distribution of the gain may be ameliorated somewhat by
the fact that any person may, at some point, become a plaintiff.
"5 "Emile Durkheim, a founder of sociology, posited that there is a limit to the
amount of deviant behavior any community can 'afford to recognize.' As behavior
worsens, the community adjusts its standards so that conduct once thought reprehen-
sible is no longer deemed so." ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 3
(1996) (quoting Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, AM. SCHOLAR, Win-
ter 1993, at 19 (citation omitted)).
16 The moral suasion associated with official action is commonly acknowledged in
the area of civil rights. See, e.g., Marlene Z. Stanger, Note, Hate Crimes Legislation:
Panacea or Protractor of Societal Ills?, 3 S.D. JUST. J. 419, 446 (1995) (concluding that
"[c]ritics and cynics may point all they wish to the fact that President Clinton's state-
ments came on the eve of an election year, but by taking a stand against hate crimes
and discrimination, he provided the necessary leadership on which emulation may
lie").
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not require any reduction in procedure above the reductions already
provided for the protection of the defendant.
Socially beneficial enterprises that cannot otherwise hedge risk
will likely be indifferent to the amount of procedure given. The key
point of reference for hedging is not cost, but changes 
in cost.1 1 7
Harm to shallow-pocket consumers-those who must settle for less
than the legislature intended-and offended plaintiffs is reduced by
the creation of a publicly supervised market for champertous claims.
A consumer who can show a colorable, marketable claim will not be
shallow-pocketed for long. Every plaintiff can get exactly what the leg-
islature intended. While some opprobrium has been built into the
system for plaintiffs who sell, it is not insurmountable, and, as sug-
gested above, is likely to impede very little.
The weary, weary courts are served in both ways. With the crea-
tion of the parallel courts of champerty and the better evidentiary
background for champertous agreements, their workload will not in-
crease substantially. Meanwhile, the courts' role as guarantors of jus-
tice is served by the fact that claims will not be abandoned on the
grounds of poverty and immediate need.
H. Odds and Ends
Champerty has become so intertwined with companion laws that a
statute legalizing public champerty must be clear about the breadth of
its intentions.
Model Act of Champerty, Section 6: (a) This Act shall have no effect on
the judicial analysis of the assignability of chose in action.
1 8 (b) A plain-
tiff exercising theprocedures laid out in section 3 of this Act is notthe proc  120
thereby criminally nor tortiously liable. (c) Where the substance of
the action funded is a dispute over a claim of property, a declaration of
champerty shall negate any statutory holding requirements. (d) The
purchaser of a judgment shall have no standing, in any wise, to partici-
pate in the case from which judgment is bought. (e) Nothing in this Act
shall be construed as allowing for the assignment of the judgment of
117 See supra note 68 (outlining the basics of hedging).
118 See, e.g., Roberts v. Holland & Hart, 857 P.2d 492, 495-96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(prohibiting assignment of legal malpractice claims, in part because such assignment
would "promote champerty").
119 See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 516(3) (West 1964) (making cham-
perta Class E crime under Maine law).
0 See, e.g., Wolford v. Tankersley, 695 P.2d 1201, 1222 (Idaho 1984) (using
"champerty" to mean a tort action available to the defendant in the funded suit, good
against the parties to the illicit contract).
132720021
1328 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150: 1297
federal claims. (f) For purposes of this statute, no suit orjudgment may
be sold in its entirety; plaintiff must retain 0.1% of the claim. (g) No
purchase made via the auction system envisioned in section 3 of this Act
will be invalidated on the grounds of usury.
This Comment has expressed the prohibition on the assignment
of choses as a logical consequence of the prohibition on the assign-
ment of future judgments.12 1 If you cannot sell X (fruit of legal judg-
ment), you cannot sell the right to sue for X. The nonassignability of
those choses should be preserved so that the claims are funneled into
the publicly supervised forum. Section 6(a) of the Model Act dis-
suades judges from interpreting the establishment of a public cham-
perty as a sign that choses should be freely assignable. Sections 6(b)
and 6(c) of this Act protect those taking advantage of the public sys-
tem from criminal, tort, and property sanctions designed to deter pri-
vate champerty. Section 6(d) limits the champertor's standing in the
suit to having an enforceable claim for a portion of thejudgment after
the fact. Section 6(d) does not prohibit, for example, a public cham-
perty system whereby the assignor must agree with the assignee before
accepting a settlement-not that the party in interest would have been
denied by the court the right to settle, but that settlement without
agreement with the counterparty would be a breach of an obligation
with the assignee and hence the subject of a collateral action. Section
(f) increases the likelihood that the plaintiff will retain the standing
required to be heard in an adverse proceeding before the state court.
I. Conclusion: Public Champerty Worth Consideration
The virtues of the system described above are theoretical. The dif-
ficulties in drafting, enacting, and administering such a system are,
however, eminently practical. In theory, public champerty is a vehicle
through which the state can make litigation financing more abundant,
scientific, and humane. The Act funnels all champerty into a state sys-
tem, monitors the auction process for impurities, and then pipes the
excess flow into new courts. In practice, such a process is sure to be
less than fluid. Drafting such a statute for any individual state will be
time consuming since the old concept of "champerty not allowed"
goes under many different names, with many different legal ramifica-
tions. Enacting the statute may be expensive, both financially and po-
litically. Auction houses and courts need to be established with tax-
121 See Martin, supra note 3, at 83 (expressing the view that a ban on champerty is
unnecessary).
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payer money, and there is no preexisting constituency for champerty
reform. Administering the auctions will be a regulatory headache.
For all its vices, however, a system of public champerty is worth
considering. For a state legislature that wants all of the remedies that
it provides to be equally effective for all of the citizens that it serves,
public champerty should be of obvious appeal.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
A. Constitutional Objections
Does the Due Process Clause 2 dictate several essential features of
fairness required by any trial in which legal rights are adjudicated,
even in the courts of champerty? No, the Clause does not constrain
our use of alternate dispute resolution in cases of public champerty.
Even ex ante, the parties have substantial authority to select the fo-
rums and modes of adjudication.2 Ex post, the parties can decline to
bring a claim to trial at all, continue at trial, raise all claims, or bring
an appeal. By implication, the parties have the ex post right to accept
a more limited-even expressly biased-trial in exchange for valuable
consideration. 4 Due process in such a case is not denied; rather, dueprocess is offered and bargained away.
B. Prudential Concerns
Would the creation of a market for legal judgments create a series
of ethical problems for lawyers, such as insider trading and unwitting
ethical conflicts among others? This is a legitimate concern that states
122 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law .. ").
123 Parties have the power ex ante to contract themselves into private alternative
dispute resolution forums. Cf Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282
(1995) (interpreting a federal statute as requiring state courts to give effect to private
arbitration clauses unless they can be invalidated "upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract" (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)).
Parties also have the power ex ante to agree to forum selection clauses provided
there are legitimate reasons for both parties to agree to the clause, and they do not
prevent or discourage the pursuit of legitimate claims. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-97 (1991) (noting that defendant is headquartered in the
state selected by the forum clause, that plaintiffs received economic benefit in the form
of lowered ticket sales because the defendant's legal costs were consolidated in that
state, and that the clause allowed for the judicial resolution of claims).
124 That plaintiffs have the right to agree ex post to a nonstandard judicial forum
is a much more modest contention.
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can readily address. The state or state bar should exclude lawyers
from participating in litigation financing altogether, save for their tra-
ditional participation in contingency fee arrangements and "blind
trust" arrangements wherein the lawyer does not know the content of
her litigation portfolio.
Would a system of public champerty encourage the idea that you
can select from the menu of torts any you want to inflict, as long as
you pay the right price? Maybe. The goals of educative punishment
might be better served by pursuing stiffer punitive damages or height-
ened criminal penalties. The denial of litigation finance options to
plaintiffs often will teach the lesson that tortious harms can be in-
flicted without paying any legal cost whatsoever.
How do you prevent judicial hostility to champertous suits?.2 As
the Model Act of Champerty is written, such hostility is an error of law:
"[t] he state court shall interpret and judge this contract as any other
commercial agreement, notwithstanding traditional prohibitions or
hostilities against champerty." 126 The ability of the states to prevent si-
lent but effective hostility in the judiciary remains to be seen. One ad-
vantage is that many suits will be heard by the courts of champerty,
whose judges are employed to hear nothing but champertous suits.
Champertous judges will quickly adopt self-supporting rationales for
why champerty is good. Other judges may never hear a champertous
suit, as most such suits are cordoned off into a specialized system.
Who can tell what a suit is worth? Currently, many small plaintiffs'
firms finance their operations through bank loans. The lending
banks evaluate the firm's financial prospects by evaluating the firm's
portfolio of cases. The pool of lawsuit evaluators will grow as the
opportunity to invest in litigation grows. Any doubt that the finance
industry is up to the task of evaluating litigation should be dispelled by
an empirical evaluation of the lawsuit investment industry growing up
in champerty's absence.2 "
What keeps the plaintiffs interested? Depending on how the auc-
tion is structured, the plaintiff may still own a portion of the eventual
125 See Dobner, supra note 13, at 1530 (noting that one lawsuit syndicator "has en-
countered judicial hostility to its business" (citations omitted)).
126 Supra Part III.C (proposing Model Act of Champerty § 2(b)).
127 See, e.g.,JONATHAN HARR, A CML AcTION 212-15 (1995) (describing one plain-
tiffs' firm's successful attempt to secure a bank loan based on a portfolio of pending
cases).
128 See George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry: How Much
Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 821-34 (2001) (detailing the recent
expansion of the litigation funding industry).
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legal judgment. Moreover, a prudent state will have the claim-
purchaser's entire payment put in trust. From this trust, the plaintiffs
living, medical, and legal expenses will be paid when incurred. The
residue of the trust will be paid to the plaintiff upon either (1) suc-
cessful completion of the litigation, or (2) a determination, by the
claim-purchaser or a neutral arbitrator, that the litigant made every
reasonable effort to secure the maximum recovery.
In any case, the auction contract between the assignee and the as-
signor has an implied covenant of good faith. If the plaintiff's lacklus-
ter efforts in advance of her case have caused the assignment of judg-
ment to substantially lose value, then the assignee may allege that this
covenant has been broken.12 9 Finally, even a plaintiff with no financial
interest in the final judgment may have a lasting collateral interest.
For example, the plaintiff may wish to see a tortfeasor pay for her mis-
deeds, to estop a point of fact from relitigation, or to get an injunction
against future misdeeds. Most importantly, the Model Code leaves
substantial room for states to perfect practices whereby the plaintiff is
kept interested: nothing can change in the courtroom or outside the
courtroom, and collateral contractual obligations may obtain; the
plaintiff may be held to a higher standard of good faith than a stan-
dard contractor; the purchases may have a contractual, though not
procedural, right to veto settlement offers; and so on.
C. Technical Questions
Who pays the lawyer? Whose personal rights and immunities are
before the court? Who gets to decide whether to appeal, what evi-
dence to enter, etc.? The plaintiff makes all of the decisions in the
case. She receives the judgment. She pays the lawyer. 3
° It is her
rights and immunities that are before the court. Section 6(d) of the
Act provides that "[t]he purchaser of ajudgment shall have no stand-
ing, in any wise, to participate in the case from which judgment is
bought.,1' 1 By leaving total control of the case in the plaintiff's hands,
the Act minimizes the impact of the courtroom on champerty. Legal
strategy will not twist and turn as the suit is sold and resold. The in-
129 See Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 193 (N.H. 1989)
("[U]nder an agreement that... invest[s] one party with a degree of discretion in per-
formance sufficient to deprive another party of a substantial proportion of the agree-
ment's value, the parties' intent to be bound ... raises an implied obligation of good
faith to observe reasonable limits in exercising that discretion ....").
31 She also is obviously contractually bound to pay the assignee.
131 Supra Part III.H (proposing Model Act of Champerty § 6(d)).
2002]
1332 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1297
terests of counsel will not be divided between her client and the even-
tual inheritors of the judgment. Although a contractual relationship
with investors may exist, no party before the court will be a puppet for
any party outside the court. An interesting set of problems may ac-
crue where the plaintiff is offered injunctive relief after seeking
money damages. If the champertor has a contractual right to veto set-
tlements, the plaintiff may decide to try an effective breach, or to bar-
gain with the champertor for approval.
Where can a party appeal for reversal of an adverse judgment in
the court of champerty? The parties may exercise any of the rights of
appeal granted to them by a state's Rules of Champertous Procedure.
This may, but need not, include redress to the standard state appellate
courts. There is nothing inherently unjust about having no right of
appeal. For example, a party over whose claim the United States Su-
preme Court has original jurisdiction also has no right to appeal.
These complications could be multiplied without difficulty. But in
the author's opinion, the often-overlooked abilities of the state legisla-
tures to innovate are more than a match for all possible objections.
CONCLUSION
As the whole of this Comment has argued, the current litigation
financing system causes needless human suffering. A better system
must be built, piece by piece. This Comment ends having drawn only
in broad strokes. The final blueprints can only be drafted by the state
legislatures themselves, adjusting for the unique circumstances of the
land and people over which they retain residual sovereignty.
132 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party, the su-
preme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.").
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APPENDIX: CHAMPERTY LAW FROM THE FIFTY STATES
The following overview of champerty law in the United States is
offered for three reasons. First, it showcases the patchwork that is
modem champerty law. Second, as best the author can ascertain, the
cases and statutes cited represent the current law of champerty in
each jurisdiction. Third, this compilation is offered for the benefit of
future inquirers into champerty, as a mess of raw materials from which
champerty's vocabulary, reasoning, and trajectory can be extracted for
analysis.
Alabama. Wilson v. Harris: An Alabama court refused to enforce a
contract that "does not satisfy all the requirements for champerty,"
because "it nevertheless violates the public policy against gambling
and speculating in litigation." 688 So. 2d 265, 270 (Ala. Civ. App.
1996).
Alaska. Wichman v. Benner: The Alaska Supreme Court recently
alluded to, but did not define, a "public policy against champerty and
maintenance." 948 P.2d 484, 487 (Alaska 1997).
Arizona. Landi v. Arkules: The "doctrine of champerty or mainte-
nance does not apply in Arizona." 835 P.2d 458, 464 n.1 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992).
Arkansas. Bennett v. NAACP: In the latest Arkansas case to men-
tion champerty, according to a LEXIS search, the Arkansas Supreme
Court struck down as unconstitutional a state antichamperty law that
would "make[] the single act of proposing that a fellow man litigate,
regardless of intention or the merits of the proposed litigation, or re-
gardless of the good intentions of the proposer, a felonious act in this
society punishable by heavy fine and imprisonment." 370 S.W.2d 79,
82 (Ark. 1963) (citation omitted).
California. Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court: "California ... has
never adopted the common law doctrines of champerty and mainte-
nance . .. ." 741 P.2d 124, 141-42 n.26 (Cal. 1987).
Colorado. Miller v. Calvin: A federal district court sitting in Colo-
rado denied certification of a class action which had "the taint of col-
lusion, champerty and maintenance." No. CIV.A.82-C-2253, 1984 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21057, at *26 (D. Colo. Dec. 20, 1984).
Roberts v. Holland & Hart: The assignment of legal malpractice
claims was prohibited, in part because such assignment would "pro-
mote champerty." 857 P.2d 492, 495-96 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
Casserleigh v. Wood: However, the Colorado Court of Appeals has
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suggested that champerty per se is not prohibited under state law. 59
P. 1024, 1026-27 (Colo. Ct. App. 1900).
Connecticut. Robertson v. Town of Stonington: "This common law
doctrine of champerty and maintenance, as applied to civil actions,
has never been adopted in Connecticut, and the only test is whether a
particular transaction is against public policy," and an agreement in
which a stranger helps another assert a right for a share of the pro-
ceeds is contrary to public policy. No. CV950534631, 1999 Conn. Su-
per. LEXIS 592, at *8, *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1999), affd, 750
A.2d 460 (Conn. 2000).
Delaware. Hall v. State: "It is the duty of [this Delaware] court to
dismiss a case in which the evidence discloses that the assignment of
the cause of action sued upon was tainted with champerty," because
"[ijn [Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1 (Del. 1993)], the
[Delaware] Supreme Court noted that the activities of the plaintiff
constituted neither champerty nor maintenance, implicitly recogniz-
ing the continuing vitality of the doctrines under Delaware law." 655
A.2d 827, 830 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994), affd, No. 383 1994, 1995 Del.
LEXIS 395 (Del. Oct. 27, 1995).
District of Columbia. Marshall v. Bickel: The court explained that
in a champertous fee arrangement, "(1) the attorney's fee must come
from the recovery in a successful lawsuit; (2) the lawyer must have no
independent claim to the recovery fund; and (3) the costs and expenses
must be borne by the attorney with no expectation of reimbursement from the cli-
ent," stated that a contract deemed to be champertous will not be en-
forced by the District of Columbia courts, and held that "the attorney
will be denied even quantum meruit recovery." 445 A.2d 606, 609 (D.C.
1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Florida. Kraft v. Mason: "[T]he few cases in Florida on this sub-
ject support the more modern-day approach that officious intermed-
dling is a necessary element of champerty. We define officious as 'of-
fering unnecessary and unwanted advice or services .... ."' 668 So. 2d
679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted).
Georgia. Georgia Code Annotated: "Contracts of maintenance or
champerty" are unenforceable as contrary to the public policy of
Georgia. GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-2(a) (5) (1982 & Supp. 2001).
Hawaii. Van Gieson v. Magoon: In 1910, the Hawaii Supreme
Court enforced a contract which "appears to be of a champertous na-
ture" because "[t]he conditions of society under which the law of
maintenance and champerty originated no longer exist." 20 Haw.
146, 148-49 (1910).
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Idaho. Wolford v. Tankersley: "While Idaho law does not recognize
champerty and maintenance .. .the goals of champerty and mainte-
nance provisions are still around and well, both defensively and offen-
sively, in the form of actions or defenses based on abuse of process or
malicious prosecution of civil actions." 695 P.2d 1201, 1222 (Idaho
1984).
Illinois. Puckett v. Empire Stove Co.: "Champerty and maintenance
have been disapproved by the courts as against public policy because a
litigious person could harass and annoy others if allowed to purchase
claims for pain and suffering and pursue the claims in court as an as-
signee." 539 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
Indiana. Reichhart v. City of New Haven: Indiana defines cham-
perty and maintenance as "the aiding of a litigant by a stranger having
no interest, direct or remote, immediate or contingent on agreement
with the party in interest, whereby the stranger is to receive a part of
the thing in dispute." 674 N.E.2d 27, 32 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (ci-
tation omitted).
Iowa. Ontjes v. McNider: The Iowa Supreme Court reiterated the
holding of a previous court that "a contract of an attorney that pro-
duced champerty and maintenance would be declared void as against
public policy." 12 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Iowa 1943) (citing Boardman &
Brown v. Thompson, 25 Iowa 487 (1868)).
Kansas. Boettcher v. Criscione: "[C] ommon barratry and champerty
have been... generally defined as ... frequently exciting and stirring
up quarrels either at law or otherwise. Whether champerty and barra-
try is in violation of public policy... turns largely on the facts and cir-
cumstances of each case." 299 P.2d 806, 811 (Kan. 1956).
Kentucky. Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated: Kentucky law
renders void "[a]ny contract, agreement or conveyance made in con-
sideration of services to be rendered in the prosecution or defense,
... by any person not a party on record in the suit, whereby the thing
sued for or in controversy ... is to be taken, paid or received for such
services or assistance." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.060 (Michie 1996).
Louisiana. Balboa Insurance Co. v. Algernon Blair, Inc.: "Out of a
rich Louisiana gumbo [of state law], the [federal] District Court de-
tected the bitterness of the ancient doctrine of champerty and dis-
missed the plaintiff's case as violative of public policy. We have sub-
jected the identical recipe to our appellate palate and have found the
concoction to be both savory and nutritious." 795 F.2d 404, 405 (5th
Cir. 1986).
Maine. Maine Revised Statutes Annotated: "A person is guilty of
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champerty if, with the intent to collect by a civil action a claim, ac-
count, note or other demand due, or to become due to another per-
son, he gives or promises anything of value to such person." ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 516(1) (West 1983). In Maine, champerty is a
Class E crime, id. § 516(3), warranting a fine of up to $1000, id. §
1301 (1) (E), or imprisonment of up to 6 months, id. § 1252(2) (E).
Maryland. Hernandez v. Suburban Hospital Ass'n: Maryland allows
for the prejudgment assignment of personal injury awards to health
care providers to secure incurred medical expenses. 572 A.2d 144,
148 (Md. 1990).
Massachusetts. Saladini v. Righellis: Massachusetts no longer rec-
ognizes champerty as an offense. But this "ruling today should not be
interpreted to indicate our authorization of the syndication of law-
suits." 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 n.7 (Mass. 1997).
Michigan. Smith v. Childs: "[T]he [contract] defense of cham-
perty does not exist in Michigan except as specified by statute with re-
gard to attorneys." 497 N.W.2d 538, 540 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
Minnesota. Huber v. Johnson: "We do not think that any court...
has ever gone so far as to hold that contracts may not so manifestly
tend to stir up strife . . .and speculative litigation, and prevent the
amicable compromise of claims between citizens, as to be void on
grounds of public policy." 70 N.W. 806, 807-08 (Minn. 1897).
Mississippi. Mississippi Code Annotated: Under Mississippi law, it
is unlawful for any person "either before or after proceedings com-
menced: (a) to promise, give, or offer, (b) to receive or accept ....
(c) to solicit, request, or donate, any money.., or any other thing of
value, or any other assistance as an inducement to any person to
commence or to prosecute further.., any proceeding in any court,"
but this provision does not infringe on the constitutional right "of
regular employment of any attorney at law or solicitor in chancery, for
either a fixed fee or upon a contingent basis, to represent such per-
son." MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-11 (1999). "Any person violating any of
the provisions of section 97-9-11 shall be guilty of maintenance and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for one
year in the state penitentiary." Id. § 97-9-13.
Sneed v. Ford Motor Co.: "Mississippi has declared champerty and
maintenance unlawful." 735 So. 2d 306, 309 (Miss. 1999).
Missouri. Macke Laundry Service Ltd. Partnership v. Jetz Service Co.:
Actions of champerty and maintenance of litigation "are rare in mod-
ern times, having been replaced by the causes of action of abuse of
process, wrongful initiation of litigation and malicious prosecution"
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but "have been found to be in force in this state by the Missouri Su-
preme Court." 931 S.W.2d 166, 171 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (citations
omitted).
Montana. Montana Code Annotated: "An attorney and counselor
must not ... promise or give ... a valuable consideration to any per-
son as an inducement to placing or in consideration of having placed
in his hands or in the hands of another person a demand of any kind
for the purpose of bringing an action thereon." MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 37-61408(2) (2001). "[Section 37-61408(2) applies] to a person
prosecuting an action in person who does an act which an attorney
and counselor is therein forbidden to do." Id. § 37-61411 (2001).
Green v. Gremaux: "Today, the common law prohibition of cham-
perty is codified at § 37-61408 [of the Montana Code Annotated]."
945 P.2d 903, 907 (Mont. 1997).
Lussy v. Bennett: The Montana Supreme Court voided a contract
as violative of § 37-61-411, asserting that a suit to enforce its provisions
"smacks of champerty, and public policy requires dismissal of [the]
action." 692 P.2d 1232, 1235-36 (Mont. 1984).
Nebraska. Omaha & Republican Valley Railway Co. v. Brady:
"Champerty is not a criminal offense, nor is a champertous contract
illegal under our statutes; and if this contract is champertous and
voidable, it is because it is contrary to public policy to enforce it." 57
N.W. 767, 772 (Neb. 1894).
Nevada. Schwartz v. Eliades: "'To maintain the suit of another is
now, and always has been, held to be unlawful, unless the person
maintaining has some interest in the subject of the suit."' 939 P.2d
1034, 1036 (Nev. 1997) (quoting Lur v. Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347, 350
(Nev. 1971)). Champerty is a species of maintenance hinging on the
absence of an interested party.
New Hampshire. Adkin Plumbing & Heating Supply Co. v. Harwell:
"[We have] noted the changing attitude toward contracts in cham-
perty and determined that such contracts no longer constituted a vio-
lation of public policy." 606 A.2d 802, 803-04 (N.H. 1992).
Markarian v. Bartis: "It is our conclusion that, except in those
cases where it is found as a fact that litigious strife is sought to be
promoted, the rule against champerty and maintenance is not now in
force in this jurisdiction." 199 A. 573, 577 (N.H. 1938).
New Jersey. Polo v. Gotchel: "This Court need not address the doc-
trines of champerty and maintenance, as they do not presently exist in
New Jersey." 542 A.2d 947, 949 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (cita-
tion omitted).
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New Mexico. Reinhardt v. Kelly: The New Mexico Court of Ap-
peals overturned, on the facts, a trial court ruling that "declared an
agreement between the Plaintiff and [a third party] to file the suit as
champertous and thus void as against public policy." 917 P.2d 963,
963-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
New York. New York Judiciary Law: New York law curtails the
purchase of any "bond, promissory note, bill of exchange, book debt,
or other thing in action, or any claim or demand, with the intent and
for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon." N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 1983).
Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank: "Champerty is a vener-
able doctrine developed hundreds of years ago to prevent or curtail
the commercialization of or trading in litigation. It is currently codi-
fied in New York as Judiciary Law § 489." 731 N.E.2d 581, 582 (N.Y.
2000).
Coopers & Lybrand v. Levitt: "The doctrine of champerty does not
prevail in this State except as provided by statute." 384 N.Y.S.2d 804,
807 (App. Div. 1976) (citations omitted).
Grossman v. Schlosser: While personal injury tort claims are not as-
signable under N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-101 (McKinney Supp.
2001), "the assignment of the proceeds of such a cause of action, prior
to its settlement or adjudication, [is] valid and effectual as an equita-
ble assignment against the assignor and his attaching creditor, and...
such an assignment [is] not against public policy." 244 N.Y.S.2d 749,
750-51 (App. Div. 1963).
North Carolina. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. First of
Georgia Insurance Co.: "The assignment of a claim gives the assignee
control of the claim and promotes champerty. Such a contract is
against public policy. The assignment of the proceeds of a claim does
not give the assignee control of the case and there is no reason it
should not be valid." 455 S.E.2d 655, 657 (N.C. 1995) (citation omit-
ted).
North Dakota. Interstate Collection Agency v. Kuntz: "'While the
authorities differ as to all the ingredients essential to constitute cham-
perty, they seem agreed that the gist of the offense is the malicious or
officious intermeddling in a suit in which the intermeddler has no in-
terest.'" 181 N.W.2d 234, 242 (N.D. 1970) (quoting Rohan v. John-
son, 156 N.W. 936, 937 (N.D. 1916)).
Ohio. Tosi v. Jones: " [T]he doctrines of champerty and mainte-
nance appear in numerous Ohio cases as contract defenses. Ohio has
never recognized a common law tort for champerty and mainte-
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nance." 685 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (citations omit-
ted).
Oklahoma. Mitchell v. Amerada Hess Corp.: "The proof necessary
to demonstrate the contract to lease for oil and gas was champertous
must establish both officious intermeddling and lack of an interest in
the action apart from the alleged champertous document." 638 P.2d
441, 444 (Okla. 1981).
Oregon. Brown v. Bigne: "The doctrine of champerty ... ought
not to prevail when such aid is furnished by a layman; but when such
contracts are made for the purpose of stirring up strife and ... induc-
ing suits to be begun which otherwise would not.., they come within
*.. that doctrine, and should not be enforced." 28 P. 11, 13 (Or.
1891).
Pennsylvania. Clark v. Cambria County Board of Assessment Appeals:
"[C]hamperty has long been considered repugnant to public policy
against profiteering and speculating in litigation and grounds for de-
nying the aid of the court. The common law doctrine against cham-
perty and maintenance continues to be a viable doctrine in Pennsyl-
vania and can be raised as a defense." 747 A.2d 1242, 1245-46 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000) (citations omitted).
Rhode Island. Martin v. Clarke: "Whether we look, therefore, at
the ancient common law, to the English statutes upon the subject, or
to our own legislation, the conclusion must be the same,-that cham-
perty is an offence against the law. Being such, it must avoid every
contract into which it enters." 8 R.I. 389, 403 (1866).
South Carolina. Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. Partnership: "[W]e
abolish champerty as a defense. We are convinced that other well-
developed principles of law can more effectively accomplish the goals
of preventing speculation in groundless lawsuits . . . than dated no-
tions of champerty." 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000).
South Dakota. McKellips v. Mackintosh: "There [has been] no
statutory or judicial repudiation of the common law remedy of cham-
perty; therefore, this court must hold that the doctrines of champerty
and maintenance currently apply in South Dakota." 475 N.W.2d 926,
929 (S.D. 1991).
Tennessee. Record v. Insurance Co. of North America: "[I]n 1899 the
Champerty Statutes of this State were repealed to leave in effect only
that portion of the laws which relates to the effect of the conveyance
of land adversely held." 438 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tenn. 1969).
Can Do Inc. v. Mainer: The Tennessee Supreme Court voided a
contract assigning legal malpractice claims, in part because such as-
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signments promote champerty. 922 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1996).
Texas. Baker v. Mallios: A Texas court adopted North Carolina's
position that assignments of chose in action are more problematic
than mere assignments of future judgment. 971 S.W.2d 581, 587
(Tex. App. 1998).
Utah. Croco v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.: The Utah Supreme
Court held that the common law of champerty and maintenance, as
modified by statute in the case of attorneys and clients, is a contract
defense that must be plead or lost. 54 P. 985, 987-88 (Utah 1898).
Vermont. D'Amato v. Donatoni: In the most recent champerty case
heard by the Vermont Supreme Court, that court found an attorney's
contingency fee contract not to be champertous. The Court cited
Hamilton v. Gray, 31 A. 315, 316 (Vt. 1894), for the propositions that
"[a] champertous agreement was void at common law, and we think
the common law as to champerty is in force in this state." 168 A. 564,
568 (Vt. 1933).
Virginia. Virginia Code Annotated: "Only those causes of action
for damage to real or personal property .... and causes of action ex
contractu are assignable .... [T] his section shall not prohibit any in-
jured party or his estate from making a voluntary assignment of the
proceeds or anticipated proceeds of any court award or settlement
." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-26 (Michie 2000).
In re Musser: "[T] he prohibition against assignments of causes of
action for personal injury does not proscribe a hospital from obtain-
ing an equitable assignment of the sums to be recovered by an indi-
vidual from a tortfeasor to the extent of the value of the services pro-
vided by the hospital." 24 B.R. 913, 922 (W.D. Va. 1982).
Washington. Giambattista v. National Bank of Commerce: "It is ques-
tionable whether many remnants of these doctrines [champerty and
maintenance] remain in this state." 586 P.2d 1180, 1186 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978).
West Virginia. Currence v. Ralphsnyder: The West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals recognized that the circumstances which ne-
cessitated champerty no longer exist, and the court refused to "nullify
the contract merely because it savors of champerty under the com-
mon law." 151 S.E. 700, 702 (W. Va. 1929).
Wisconsin. Wisconsin Statutes Annotated: "No action, special
proceeding, cross complaint or counterclaim in any court shall be
dismissed on the ground that a party to the action is a party to a con-
tract savoring of champerty or maintenance unless the contract is the
basis of the claim pleaded." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.375 (West 1997).
20021 MAKING CHAMPERTY WORK 1341
Wyoming. Johnson v. Sellers: The Wyoming Supreme Court heard
a claim that the purchase of land with the intent to bring suit should
be voided as champerty. 84 P.2d 744, 745 (Wyo. 1938). The court,
however, has never directly ruled on the enforceability of a champer-
tous contract formed between a plaintiff and a champertor other than
the plaintiff's lawyer.
* * * * * *
